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The new sovereignty since 1991Page 1 of 4
The new sovereignty since 1991: From traumatic experiences of the past to perspectives of a European future Introduction The changes which took place in the Soviet Union while Michael Gorbachev was in power, which were motivated in reaction to a severe economic crisis and growing discontent among the numerous national minorities, lent the independence movements in the Baltic region an opportunity which they had not had for almost half a century. Lithuania set the pace; as in Poland, the Catholic Church proved to be an effective opponent of the government on account of its efficient organisation; national historical consciousness in Lithuania had remained largely unbroken, and Russification there was far less effective than in Estonia and Latvia on account of the strict policies of the Lithuanian communists. Then the ‘singing revolution’ broke out in 1988/1989, whose numerous non-violent demonstrations, such as the six-hundred-kilometre-long human chain from Tallinn to Vilnius, aroused good will all over the world. In January 1991, at a time when unrest was fermenting throughout the peripheries of the Soviet Union and the eastern bloc began to break down, people were killed in Vilnius and Riga. Lithuanians, Latvians and Estonians still disbelieve to a certain extent that responsibility for this state brutality cannot be directly ascribed to Gorbachev. The putsch of August 1991, which heralded the imminent collapse of the Soviet Union, opened the way towards renewed independence in the Baltic states. The Russian troops finally left Baltic territory in 1994, marking a moving turnaround and reversal of the events of 1940 and 1944/45. Difficulties arose in relation to the Russians who had immigrated to the region during Soviet rule and who enjoyed higher living standards by the Baltic Sea than they would have if they returned to Russia, and whose return was not in the interests of Russia. The treatment of these Russian ‘minorities’, who had to face the prospect of changing their habits and living on an equal footing alongside the small Baltic nations, proved to be the acid test for governments in the region; for this was to test the credibility of their expressed desire to fully accept European values and, as a consequence, ensure whether they could rely on the unmitigated solidarity of Europe. However, for tourists visiting the Baltic region, these tensions between Russians and local nationals are hardly noticeable. How do these conditions and developments affect the urban landscapes in the region, and to what extent do they manifest themselves visually? Two aspects are of particular interest: the restoration of historical buildings following independence and, by stark contrast, the creation of so-called ‘occupation museums’. Restoration projects and the image of history they stand for The restoration of historical buildings was carried out in a comparable manner in the historical centres of Riga, Tallinn and Vilnius. All three cities suffered war and decay, but have all now been classified as UNESCO world heritage sites. The reasons for this are obvious. Above all, they want to improve local economies by attracting tourists to capital cities which for decades were only partially accessible, had become rather unattractive as a result of decay, and now appeared to be all the more attractive on account of their being new and accessible. The aim was to restore historical buildings from Danish, German, Swedish, Polish and tsarist times to their former glory in order to emphasise old links to Europe, and to draw attention away from the dullness of the Soviet times with their unimaginative colossal buildings and modern suburbs. The local and city history museums of these three capital cities have similar aims. The pre-Soviet times are almost systematically glorified due to the ways of presenting them. Of course, those familiar with the history of the Baltic region know that violence and repression were commonplace under all the earlier foreign regimes; yet these regimes also permitted culture and civilisation to flourish, and did not hinder, but rather favoured the national awakening of the three state-nations of today. By comparison, the consequences of Soviet rule are presented as an unparalleled political and economic failure which undermined the national and European culture of the peoples of the Baltic region, and which even jeopardised their ethnic make-up. The fact that hardly any of the buildings in the historical city centres, which Estonians, Latvians and Lithuanians are so eager to restore, were built by their own ancestors, but rather by representatives of the upper classes at that time, seems to be of no consequence. The overriding factor is the European perspective. Even the architectural heritage of the tsarist times such as classicist palaces and Orthodox church buildings appears to be compatible with this European perspective – whereas it is the traces of Soviet imperialism that constitute an exception. De facto, however, especially Tallinn, with its relatively high number of buildings dating from the time of the Teutonic Order and the Hanseatic League (cathedral, churches, town hall and city fortification), reminds visitors particularly of the German heritage of the area. |
